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INTRODUCTION
In the i96os and early 1970s, states across the country were caught
up in a wave of criminal law reform unprecedented in our history.
Influenced by the American Law Institute's development of the Model
Penal Code, more than two-thirds of the states adopted comprehensive
new criminal codes. In all major respects, these new codes were better
than any that had previously been in place.'
Since that period of turbulent change, there has been little
momentum for further development or refinement of American criminal
codes. Worse, the changes to criminal codes over the past generation-
and there have been numerous changes, as we shall discuss-have
undercut, rather than built on, the useful reforms implemented earlier by
adopting comprehensive codes. The last thirty years have seen a serious
and growing degradation of most criminal codes.
We are not the first to recognize and lament the growing problems
with American criminal codes.' We have written this Article because we
believe our personal experiences with criminal law reform efforts in two
states have taught us a few lessons about why this trend is occurring and
about possible ways to reverse the downward spiral. Part I of this Article
documents examples of the trend and describes its harmful effects. In
Part II, we discuss the current political processes and incentives driving
the degradation of criminal law. The constituencies and influences that
drive political decision-making in criminal law frequently operate to
impede reform and can even erode past reform. These impediments may
reflect unconscious biases inherent in the political process or deliberate
efforts to promote the interests of one group over others. Whatever the
underlying cause, it has become clear that most legislatures no longer use
their criminal law codification power to promote broad and useful
change, but have become "offense factories" churning out more and
more narrow, unnecessary, and often counterproductive new offenses.
Because no elected legislative member can afford to appear "soft on
crime," proposed penalty enhancements and new offenses often sail
through the legislature with little public complaint, even though privately
legislators recognize they contain serious flaws. Many legislators bemoan
the "enormous, almost hydraulic pressure to pass any criminal law bill
that is offered, unless you don't care about [keeping] the job."3
i. For a description of what we mean by "better" in this context, see Michael T. Cahill et al., The
Five Worst (and Five Best) American Criminal Codes, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 3-20 (2000).
2. See, e.g., Sara Sun Beale, What's Law Got to Do With It? The Political, Social, Psychological
and Other Non-Legal Factors Influencing the Development of (Federal) Criminal Law, I BUFF. CRIM.
L. REV. 23 (1997); Douglas Husak, Is the Criminal Law Important?, I OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 261 (2003);
William Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MIcH. L. REV. 505 (2001).
3. Interview by Stephen Haedicke with Dawn Clark Netsch, former Illinois state senator, in
Chicago, Ill. (Mar. 18, 2001).
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As was true forty years ago, the time is ripe for a new wave of
criminal law reform. But the nature of the problem and the possibility of
arriving at a solution are significantly different this time around. In the
1950s, the problem was stagnation: many criminal codes were woefully
incomplete, leaving many, if not most, substantive criminal law rules to
be constructed by the courts. Today, the opposite problem exists:
legislative hyperactivity has created too many statutory pronouncements
that are unnecessary and often inconsistent. Accordingly, the needed
second wave of criminal code reform is not easily cast as an opportunity
for legislatures to exert their lawmaking power, as was the first one. The
new reforms will entail a call for legislatures to put the brakes on their
own excesses, which is perhaps a less palatable idea.
Even so, we believe that it is not only desirable but feasible for states
to engage in a far-reaching reevaluation of their practices in enacting
criminal law legislation. Indeed, as we discuss in Part III, such a
reevaluation has the potential to achieve substantial and lasting changes
that would prevent future legislatures from degrading their criminal
codes as past legislatures have done.
I. THE ACCELERATING DEGRADATION OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL CODES
A. EVIDENCE OF DEGRADATION
Let us briefly give some indication of what we mean when we say
that criminal codes have shown a tendency to degrade over time. We are
most familiar with two states in particular - Illinois and Kentucky-
because we have been involved in their recent major reform projects. For
the sake of simplicity and consistency, our examples will draw heavily
from just one of those states, Illinois. The problems we identify, however,
are by no means unique to Illinois-they are all too typical of the
development of American criminal codes over the last thirty years. In
fact, both Illinois and Kentucky should be commended for having an
unusual level of interest in addressing the problems created by criminal
code degradation, as evidenced by their willingness to fund major and
comprehensive criminal code rewrite efforts.
The main form of degradation is the proliferation of numerous new
offenses that duplicate, but may be inconsistent with, prior existing
offenses. For example, four decades of piecemeal modification of the
Illinois Criminal Code have led to the addition of hundreds of new
offenses, many of which cover the same conduct as previous offenses
(and, in some cases, provide for conflicting levels of punishment) or
appear in various chapters of the Illinois Statutes instead of in the
Criminal Code. One might expect that over time, as more loopholes or
omissions in a code are eliminated, there would be a reduced need to
alter or expand that code, but historical trends demonstrate that the
March 2005]
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opposite is true. The process of amending the Illinois Criminal Code-
through the addition of new offenses, expansion of existing offenses, and
increases in available penalties-has not only continued, but has actually
accelerated over time.' Now forty years old, the Illinois Code underwent
nearly twice as many amendments in its second twenty years of existence
than in its first twenty years.5 Looking only at new offenses, over fifty
offenses were added in the i98os6 (more than the total number of
offenses added in the i96os and 1970s combined!7 ) and over seventy
more were added in the 199OS. s The rate at which the legislature has
increased penalties for existing offenses has also accelerated.9
Today, both Illinois and Kentucky also define numerous serious
crimes outside the Criminal Code. In Illinois, hundreds of misdemeanors
and low-grade felonies are scattered throughout the Compiled Statutes,
and more than eighty offenses outside the Criminal Code are graded as
"Class 3" felonies or higher, corresponding to a sentence of two to five
years imprisonment.'" For example, the Illinois Public Aid Code defines
several "public assistance fraud" offenses-graded as high as "Class I"
felonies, with a corresponding sentence of four to fifteen years"-that
overlap substantially with several Criminal Code offenses such as theft,
state benefits fraud, public aid wire fraud, and public aid mail fraud.'2
Similarly, the Illinois Vehicle Code defines several vehicle theft offenses
aimed at "chop shops" in the business of receiving stolen vehicles, and
grades the offense of organizing an "aggravated vehicle theft conspiracy"
as the most serious class of felony ("Class X," which is the only class
above Class i3), although all of the relevant conduct-vehicle theft,
4. A recent study identifies and analyzes all the changes to the Illinois Criminal Code since i96i,
pointing out that the number of new amendments has increased over time. Stephen Haedicke,
Punishing Democracy: A Political History of the Amendments to the Illinois Criminal Code of i96i,
with Recommendations for Change 65 (May 2o, 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors)
("As should be obvious simply from the frequency of amendments during the 198os and especially the
199os, this dynamic [of modifying and expanding the code] is accelerating.").
5. Id. at 6o ("The sheer number of amendments to the Criminal Code in the I98os and 199os,
almost double that of the i96os and 1970s, reveals that a change had taken place in the General
Assembly's relation to Illinois criminal law.").
6. See id. at 37-40 (identifying and describing each of these new offenses).
7. See id. at 17-19, 25-26 (identifying and describing offenses added in I96OS and 197Os).
8. See id. at 46-51 (identifying and describing each of these new offenses).
9. See id. at 56-6o (identifying enhancements to criminal penalties enacted during the 199os).
io. See 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-8-I(a)(6) 0997). The authors would like to thank the staff
attorneys of the Illinois Criminal Code Rewrite and Reform Commission, Scott England and T.R.
Eppel, for their work on the commentary to the Commission's proposed Code, which provided many
of the examples we discuss in this Article.
It. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-8-I(a)(4).
12. Compare, e.g., 305 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8A-i to -17 (2O01) (public assistance fraud), with 720
ILL. COMP. STAT. /s6-1 (theft), 5/17-6 (state benefits fraud), 5/17-9 (public aid wire fraud), and 5/17-10
(public aid mail fraud).
13. 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-8-I(a)(3) (1997) (providing standard sentence of 6 to 30 years, unless
statute defining offense provides otherwise). Of course, the very existence of "Class X" felonies
[Vol. 56:633
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receiving stolen vehicles, and conspiracy to commit either of those
offenses-is covered and graded differently by the Criminal Code.'4 In
fact, there are more than two dozen criminal offenses outside the Illinois
Criminal Code that are graded as Class I and Class 2 felonies.'5
Even within the criminal code, numerous offenses have been added
to do the job that a single well-crafted offense could do better. Dozens of
narrow, specific offenses duplicate broader prohibitions against the same
general conduct. For example, even though the current Illinois Code
already contains a provision covering theft of all things of value, a
number of other special provisions have been added to prohibit theft
under specific circumstances or involving certain forms of property, such
as library theft or delivery-container theft. 6 The legislation was not
driven by the existence of any flaw in the existing statute, but rather by
reflects the trend toward ever-higher penalties. The original Illinois Code of 1961 had Class i felonies
as the most serious category, but eventually it was thought that a new, more serious class had to be
added. See ILL. PUB. AcT 80-1099 § 3 (effective Feb. 1, 1978).
14. Compare, e.g., 625 ILL. CoMP. STAT. 5/4-103 to -1O8 (2002) (Vehicle Code provisions), with 720
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/i6-i(a)(i) (defining offense of theft by taking); 5/I6-I(a)(4) (defining offense of
receiving stolen property); 5/I6-I(b) (grading theft offenses) (2003); cf. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16-
i(b)(2) (cross-referencing Vehicle Code provisions for purposes of recidivism aggravation for theft).
15. See 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 175/10-140 (2004) (fraudulent use of signature device; Class 2 felony),
175/15-210 to -215 (fraudulent use or request of electronic signature certificate; Class 2 felony for
each), 175/15-220 (fraudulent use of signature device of certification authority; Class 2 felony); 20 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 3520/45 (20o) (making false statement or report in document before Department of
Commerce; Class 2 felony); 30 ILL. COMP. STAT. 320/4 (2OO) (fraudulently using state seal or signature;
Class 2 felony); 35 ILL. COMP. STAT. 130/22 to /23 (1996) (counterfeiting or forging cigarette tax stamps,
or selling cigarettes or other tobacco products with forged stamps; Class 2 felony for each), 5o5/5(I)
to /15(0 ) (evading motor fuel sale tax, filing false return or report to Department of Revenue, or
selling dyed diesel fuel; Class 2 felony for each); 205 ILL. COMP. STAT. 685/7 (2000) (structuring
transaction to evade currency reporting requirements; Class 2 felony); 415 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/44(b)
(2004) (endangering another by disposing hazardous waste; Class 2 felony); 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/I I-
401(d) (2002) (failing to stop when involved in auto accident involving death; Class 2 felony), 5/11 -5O1
(fourth DUI offense; Class 2 felony), 5/I8c-7502 (removal of railroad property resulting in serious
bodily injury; Class 2 felony), 45/3A-21 (forging certificate or sticker relating to watercraft; Class 2
felony); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-6-4 (0997) (escaping from correctional institution; Class 2 felony), 5/5-
8A-4.1 (failing to comply with home-monitoring program while armed; Class i felony); 765 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 835/1(b) (20O0 ) (causing $ioo,ooo in property damage in cemetery; Class 2 felony); 815 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/14 (1999) (aggravated securities fraud; Class 2 felony), 515/5 (aggravated home repair
fraud; Class 2 felony), 705/25 (false or misleading statement in selling franchise; Class 2 felony).
16. Compare 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16-1 (2003) (general theft offense), with 5/I6A-3(a) (retail
theft), 5/I6B-2(a) (library theft), and 5 /I6E-3(a)(i) & (4) (delivery-container theft).
Kentucky is similar: in addition to the general offense of theft by deception, Kentucky has several
offenses covering particular situations involving deception, such as by false representation on a loan
application or the fraudulent use of credit cards. Compare Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 5 14.040 (Michie
2003) (defining general offense of theft by deception), with Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 434.095 (Michie
2003) (obtaining real estate loan by substituting or making false instrument), Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 434.655 (Michie 2003) (fraudulent use of credit or debit card after reporting it lost, as stolen, or not
received), Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 434.66o (Michie 2003) (furnishing goods or services to user of false
credit card with intent to defraud), Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 434.670 (Michie 2003) (failure to furnish
goods, services, etc., represented in writing as furnished), and KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 516.130 (Michie
2003) (using slugs in coin machine with intent to defraud).
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some lobbying group urging a special subchapter regarding theft of a
particular kind of property.'7 The same situation applies to property-
damage offenses. There, again, the existing general prohibition provides
full coverage and a coherent grading system, but is nonetheless
supplemented with specialized offenses concerning, for example,
damaging library materials, delivery-containers, anhydrous ammonia
equipment, government-supported property, and animal facilities. 
s
These duplications are neither unimportant nor harmless. The
proliferation of potentially redundant offenses causes several significant
problems. First, overstuffed criminal codes make it more difficult for the
average citizen to understand what the criminal code commands.
Although actual notice of legal prohibitions may be more of an ideal
than a practical goal, it is an ideal that should be taken seriously. It is also
achievable, especially with the recent advances in plain-language
drafting. But rather than promoting the principle of notice, today's
criminal law creates an impregnable network of prohibitions that only a
criminal law expert could decipher.
The notice problem is further exacerbated by the increasing level of
criminalization. As William Stuntz has put it, we are moving "ever closer
to a world in which the law on the books makes everyone a felon."'
9
Even attorneys, police officers, and other law enforcement officials
cannot grasp all of the prohibitions of modern criminal law. Frequently,
these officials have little time to consult legal texts and authorities or
conduct significant research before arresting and charging an individual.
Yet even if they had all the time in the world, many would not know
where to look for all the relevant rules. Because there are often multiple
prohibitions against the same type of conduct, most officials would not
even know when to stop looking for an applicable law. The increasing
complexity, inconsistency, and unfamiliarity of most criminal codes
increase the likelihood of costly mistakes by both lawyers and trial
judges, and the odds of disparate treatment. Any given official can only
be expected to become familiar with a digestible set of "pet" offenses-
17. For example, the offense of "retail theft," see supra note I6, which basically covers
shoplifting-a form of theft that, like the other examples, was already covered by Illinois' theft
provision-was evidently enacted at the urging of the Illinois Retail Merchants Association. Why the
new offense was thought to be necessary is not clear, especially since it does not even increase the
penalty for most relevant kinds of theft. The only higher penalty available under retail theft, relative to
standard-issue theft, is when the theft involves between $15o and $300 worth of goods. Compare 720
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/i6-I(b) (2003) (penalties for theft), with 5/i6A-io (penalties for retail theft). There
is no explanation as to why this particular category, and only this category, of retail theft merits an
enhanced penalty.
18. Compare 720 ILL. CoW. STAT. 5/21-I (2004) (general property damage offense), with 5/I6B-
2.1 (2003) (damage to library materials), 5/I6E-3(a)(3) (defacing delivery-containers), 5/21-1.5
(tampering with or damaging anhydrous ammonia equipment), 5/21-4 (damaging government
supported property), and 215/4(2) (damaging an animal facility).
19. Stuntz, supra note 2, at 51I.
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but different officials may have different pet offenses, or differing levels
of familiarity with the intricacies of the law, making arbitrary treatment
more likely.
This ties into a second problem, which is that the criminalization
trend effectively destroys the rule of law. The creation of new statutory
offenses may seem like an acceptable and even desirable exercise of
legislative prerogative, in full accord with the core principles of legality
that are central to criminal law. But the modern expansion of
criminalization also reflects a shift of practical authority away from the
legislature to prosecutors and police, who now have broad discretion
over who gets punished and the level of punishment. As Douglas Husak
noted, the combination of that broad discretion with the modem trend
toward "all-encompassing offenses... is destructive of the rule of law."2
Arrest, punishment, and the level of punishment are now determined as
much by the ad hoc decision-making of individual law enforcement
officials as they are by the legal rules.'
Third, overlapping offenses introduce considerable difficulties into
the interpretation and implementation of a statutory scheme because the
relationship between multiple overlapping offenses is often unclear.
Specific offenses that duplicate a preexisting general offense call into
question the scope of the general offense. According to interpretive
canons, such an overlap must be read so that nothing is rendered
superfluous-a task that may require courts to distort the meaning of
one provision in order to accommodate another. To add prohibitions
against narrow and specific forms of conduct in addition to a general
prohibition against all such relevant conduct; or to scatter serious crimes
throughout the State's statutory code instead of keeping all relevant
offenses within the criminal code where their significance and
relationship to one another is clear is not only redundant, but potentially
counterproductive and self-contradictory.
Even if offenses do not contradict each other, efforts to use all
available offenses at once to obtain multiple punishments only introduce
confusion. For example, current Illinois law limits the total aggregate
sentence for all consecutive sentences committed as part of a single
course of conduct to the sum of the maximum terms for the two most
serious offenses.22 In a recent case interpreting this rule, the Illinois
Supreme Court held that the consecutive-sentence provision effectively
trumped a separate statutory sentence aggravation, so that the maximum
allowed sentence for the defendant's five offenses of conviction was less
20. Husak, supra note 2, at 269.
21. See also William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law's Disappearing Shadow, 117
HARV. L. REV. 2548 (2004).
22. See 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-8-4(C)(2) (i997).
March 2005]
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than-in fact, less than half of-the sentence for which he would have
been eligible had he committed only one of the offenses. 3
Fourth, in addition to confusing the relationship between offenses in
a code's Special Part, many new offenses (or revisions of earlier
provisions) ignore or affirmatively undermine rules set out in a code's
General Part. One of the profound achievements of the Model Penal
Code and its progeny was the development of sophisticated and
thorough General Part provisions that define a context and vocabulary,
such as the articulation of specific and thoroughly defined culpability
terms, that would apply to every defined offense. 4 Yet even that most
fundamental advance is often lost in what seems to be a willy-nilly rush
to maintain a continuous stream of new offenses.
For example, although Illinois' General Part defines only four basic
culpability terms-intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, and
negligently 5 -numerous additional Illinois criminal provisions employ
other terms that refer to culpability requirements, such as "specific
intent, ' '"6 "having reason to know,"27 "reasonably should know, '28
"willfully" (or "wilfully"),29  "maliciously,"3  "fraudulently," 3'
23. See People v. Pullen, 733 N.E.2d 1235, 1239 (Ill. 2000). The defendant, Dennis Pullen, pleaded
guilty to five counts of burglary, which is typically a Class 2 felony. Normally, Pullen's various prior
convictions would have led to sentencing him as a Class X offender under Illinois law. Id. at 1236; see
730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-5-3(c)(8) (requiring that defendant convicted of Class 1 or 2 felony, who has
committed two past offenses of Class 2 or higher, "shall be sentenced as a Class X offender"). If Pullen
had pleaded guilty to a single count of burglary, he would received a sentence of at least six to thirty
years, and would have been eligible for an "extended term" sentence of thirty to sixty years. See 730
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-5-3.2(b)(I) (allowing extended term based on recidivism), 5/5-8-2(a)(2) (allowing
extended-term sentence of 30 to 6o years for Class X felony).
Because he was convicted of multiple counts, however, the court had to apply Illinois'
consecutive-sentence provision. Pullen, 733 N.E.2d at 1237; see 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-8-4(C)(2). The
court interpreted that provision to require that the defendant could receive, at most, twice the
extended-term sentence for the underlying, unaggravated Class 2 felony of burglary. Pullen, 733
N.E.2d at 1239-4o. A Class 2 felony carries an extended-term sentence of seven to fourteen years, see
730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-8-2(a)(4), so the maximum sentence for Pullen would be fourteen to twenty-
eight years, instead of the thirty to sixty years available if the consecutive-sentence rules has not come
into play. See Pullen, 733 N.E.2d at 1240 ("We recognize that it may seem anomalous for defendant to
have been eligible for a longer sentence if sentenced 'as a Class X offender' for a single crime than if
he were subject to consecutive sentences for multiple crimes .... However, we are not at liberty to
rewrite the statute in the guise of interpreting it.").
24
. 
See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (1962).
25. See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/4-4 to -7 (2002).
26. See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/6-3.
27. See, e.g., 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. 18o5/94a(b)(I) (2001); 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/t8c-7502(a)(iii)
(2002); 720 ILL. CoMP. STAT. 5/12-11, 5/14-2(a)(2), 690/2.
28. See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/II-20.I(a)(t), 5/12-2I(a)(2), 5/20-1.1, 5/24-I.2(a)(2), 5/24.6-20,
5/29B-1 (2004).
29. See 720 ILL. COME. STAT. 5/12-4.8, 5/12-9(a), 5/12-21.6, 5/16-1.2, 516-3(b), 5/I6B-2(d), 5/17-15,
5/17-22, 5/17B-lo(b), 5/32-10, 5/33C-2, 5/33C-3, 5/ 33E-16, 130/2, 130/2a, 150/4.I, 66o/2; see also, e.g., 15
ILL. COMP. STAT. 520/23 (2001); 30 ILL. COME. STAT. 230/2b (2001); 35 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/130 (1996); 35
ILL. COMP. STAT. 130/22, 130/23 (1996); 55 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-11019 (993); 205 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/49,
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"designedly,' '32 or a combination of the foregoing and others.33 These
terms are generally left undefined.34
Finally, multiple overlapping offenses generate inconsistent
punishment levels. One might think that these additions and piecemeal
amendments are defensible on the ground that they are needed, or at
least useful, to specify grade distinctions among meaningfully different
offense levels. In practice, however, these overlapping offenses often
demonstrate a completely incoherent, if not self-contradictory, grading
scheme.
New offenses, or aggravations and enhancements of existing
offenses, commonly introduce seriously questionable, and sometimes
transparently disproportionate, grading distinctions. Not all offenses can
be the worst; yet the trend over time is to enhance the penalties for
62o/8-1, 635/4-4, 69o/36; 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1023 (2001); 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 535/27 (1997); 625
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/4-IO3.2(a)(7) (2002).
30. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/i6B-2.I (2003); e.g., 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. 2305/2(e) (201).
31. 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. 4020/22 (2001); 35 ILL. COMP. STAT. 130/22, 2oo21-3o6(a)(2); 310 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 10/25.04 (2001); 320 ILL. COMP. STAT. 25/9 (2001); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/I6G-I5(a), 5/17-
13,5/17-I6, 5/33C-I, 5/33C-4 (2003).
32. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/17-17 (2003).
33. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/I7-I(A)(iii) ("wilfully, and with... specific intent"), 5/17-18
("wilfully and designedly"), 5/21-1.1 ("wilfully and maliciously"), 5/32-11 ("wickedly and willfully")
(2003); 125/2(a) ("[w]ilfully obstructs or interferes with ... specific intent"); 300/I ("willfully and
maliciously"); 36o/I ("wilfully and maliciously"); 540/I ("wilfully, corruptly and falsely"); see also, e.g.,
55 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-14043 (i993) ("wilfully, corruptly and falsely"); 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 1o/9(e)
(1998) ("wilfully and maliciously"); 210 Ill. Comp. Stat. 85/6.I 7 (i) ("wilfully and wantonly"); 6o5 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 10/28 (1996) ("wilfully, maliciously and forcibly"); 61o ILL. COMP. STAT. 95/I (1996)
("willfully and maliciously"); 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1 1-503 (2002) ("willful or wanton disregard").
34. The General Part does explicitly equate "wilfully" with "knowingly" and "wantonly" with
"recklessly." See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/4-5, 5/4-6 (2002). Confusingly, however, these equivalences
only apply unless the provision "clearly requires a different meaning," indicating that even the
General Assembly anticipated some misuse of defined terms of art. Id. This equivocation as to
meaning makes it unclear whether, for example, "willfully" should be considered to be synonymous
with "knowingly" for the numerous current offenses specifying both culpability levels with respect to a
single element or set of elements; cf., e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-4.8 ("knowingly and willfully"),
5/12-9(a) ("knowingly and willfully"), /17B-Io(b) ("willfully facilitates, aids, abets, assists, or
knowingly participates in a known violation"), 130/2 ("knowingly or wilfully"), 13o/2a ("knowingly or
wilfully") (2003). As the language in those offenses indicates, Illinois offenses frequently use
"willfully" and "wantonly" coupled with other culpability requirements in a way that would render
them superfluous or inconsistent if interpreted in as sections 5/4-5 and 5/4-6 direct.
Currently, there are also no pattern jury instructions defining culpability levels other than intent,
knowledge, recklessness, and negligence. See ILL. PATrERN JURY INSrRUGFONS (CRIMINAL) 5.0i et seq.
(4th ed. 2000). The pattern jury instructions, like current 5/4-5 and 5/4-6, contain language equating
"knowingly" with "willfully," and "recklessly" with "wantonly." See id. 5.01, 5 .oIB (4th ed. 2000).
Current 5/4-5 and 5/4-6 provide, however, that such equivalence does not exist where a statute "clearly
requires a different meaning." 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/4-5, 5/4-6 (20O2). It is unclear, therefore, whether
"willfully" should be considered to be synonymous with "knowingly" for the numerous current
offenses specifying both culpability levels with respect to a single element or set of elements. Cf., e.g.,
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-4.8 ("knowingly and willfully"), 5/12-9(a) ("knowingly and willfully"), 5/17B-
io(b) ("willfully facilitates, aids, abets, assists, or knowingly participates in a known violation"); 130/2
("knowingly or wilfully"), 130/2a ("knowingly or wilfully") (2003).
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offenses so that even inherently less serious offenses, such as inchoate
endangerment crimes where nobody is harmed, are potentially subject to
the same treatment as homicides.
A number of Illinois offenses, for example, contain special grading
aggravations based on the presence or use of a weapon. Yet Illinois also
defines a variety of general weapons offenses, including an "armed
violence" provision that enhances the penalty for any felony committed
while armed. The grading of the special offense aggravation often
contradicts the punishment provided by the "armed violence" offense.
This has led Illinois courts to find on more than one occasion, and
despite several legislative acts specifically aimed at correcting the
problem, that the existing scheme for punishing offenses committed
while armed violates the Illinois Constitution35 provision requiring
"proportionate penalties" for crimes. 6  Similar findings of
unconstitutionality have also occurred in other areas where the law
employs both general aggravations that apply to all felonies and specific
aggravations within specific offenses, both of which are triggered by the
35. For example, in People v. Wisslead, the defendant was charged with unlawful restraint and
armed violence based on detaining his wife with a handgun. 446 N.E.2d 512, 512-13 (Ill. 1983). Under
the armed violence statute, the defendant could be held liable for a Class X felony for committing
unlawful restraint while armed. See 720 ILCS 5/33A-2, 33A-3; Wisslead, 446 N.E.2d at 514. Although
unlawful restraint is a lesser included offense of aggravated kidnaping (which includes kidnaping while
armed), the latter offense would have only subjected the defendant to liability for a Class i felony. Id.
Because the defendant was subject to a greater penalty for the lesser offense of armed violence based
upon unlawful restraint, the Illinois Supreme Court ruled the armed violence statute violated the
proportional penalties clause (art. I, § iI) of the Illinois Constitution. Id at 515.; see also People v.
Christy, 564 N.E.2d 770, 774 (Ill. 199o) (finding sentence for armed violence based on kidnaping
unconstitutionally disproportionate to sentence for identical offense of aggravated kidnaping).
The legislature apparently attempted to correct this problem by creating the offense of
aggravated unlawful restraint, which grades use of a deadly weapon during an unlawful restraint as a
Class 3 felony. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/10-3.1 (2002). Despite this change, an offender is still subject to
two vastly different penalties for essentially the same conduct: aggravated unlawful restraint is a Class
3 felony under 5/10-3.1, while armed violence predicated on unlawful restraint remains a Class X
felony with an enhanced minimum term under 5/33A-2 and 33A-3.
In People v. Murphy, the court rejected the defendant's argument that these offenses created
disproportionate penalties for the same conduct. 635 N.E.2d IIO, 112-13 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994). The
court found that the two offenses were not identical, because armed violence required the use of a
"dangerous weapon," while aggravated unlawful restraint required the use of a "deadly weapon." See
id. at 112. Note, however, that current law does not define the term "deadly weapon," so it is
impossible to know how it differs from a "dangerous weapon." Moreover, one would intuitively
suppose that using a "deadly weapon" would be more serious than using a "dangerous weapon," but
the current grading scheme grades it less seriously. Even so, the court found the statute
unconstitutional due to the continuing grading disparity between aggravated kidnaping and armed
violence based on unlawful restraint. Id. at 113.
The legislature acted again to correct this disparity by raising the penalties for aggravated
kidnaping (based on use of a weapon) to be comparable to armed violence (Class X felony with
enhancements). 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/IO-2(b) (2002). However, the disparity described above still
exists between the grading of aggravated unlawful restraint and armed violence based on unlawful
restraint.
36. ILL. CONST. art. I, § II (2004).
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same relevant conduct or fact.37
Endangerment offenses provide another example. Like many states,
Illinois has a general endangerment offense (in this case, called "reckless
conduct"), which grades reckless creation of a risk of serious bodily
injury or death as a Class A misdemeanor. 8 But Illinois also has
numerous offenses covering specific types of behavior that risk injury or
death, often with far more serious penalties.39 Several offenses that
criminalize discharging a firearm in the direction of others are graded
from a Class I felony to a Class X felony with a minimum imprisonment
term of twelve years, depending on the potential victim's occupation and
the type of firearm involved.' Although it is certainly more serious than
most of the other conduct covered by the current offense of "reckless
conduct," the act of firing a gun in another's direction, without any
explicitly required culpability as to causing bodily harm, and without the
requirement of any actual resulting harm or injury, is less serious than,
say, knowingly causing a catastrophe, knowingly killing another under
the influence of an extreme disturbance, or recklessly killing another
person. Yet those other offenses have similar, or even lower, punishment
grades. Illinois law grades knowingly causing, not just risking, a
catastrophe-which requires "serious physical injury to 5 or more
37. See, e.g., People v. Graves, 773 N.E.2d 1243, 1248 (I11. App. Ct. 2002) (finding penalty for
"theft by deception" against victims over 6o years old, which provides for a maximum sentence of 7
years, unconstitutionally disproportionate to penalty for "unauthorized theft," which allows maximum
extended sentence of 14 years for same conduct).
38. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-5 (2002).
39. In addition to the firearm-discharge offenses discussed in the text, current Illinois law contains
numerous offenses criminalizing creating a risk of bodily harm by specific means or to certain persons,
some of which impose punishments that vary greatly from the general offense. See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/12-2.5 (causing "an object to fall from an overpass in the direction of a moving motor vehicle
traveling upon any highway"; Class 2 felony), 5/12-4.5 (tampering with food, drugs, or cosmetics; Class
2 felony), 5/12-4.8 (possessing infected domestic animals; petty offense), 5/12-4.9 (inducing or
encouraging a child athlete to ingest a drug designed for quick weight gain or loss; Class A
misdemeanor, Class 4 felony for repeat offense), 5/12-5.1 (permitting residential real estate to
deteriorate; Class A misdemeanor, Class 4 felony for repeat offense), 5/12-5.5 ("gross carelessness or
neglect" in operating a steamboat or other public conveyance; Class 4 felony), 5/12-21.6 ("willfully"
permitting a child to be endangered; Class A misdemeanor, Class 3 felony for repeat offense); 120/5,
120/10 (hazing; Class A misdemeanor).
40. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/24-1.2 (2003) grades knowingly discharging any type of firearm in the
direction of a building or vehicle one "reasonably should know to be occupied" as a Class i felony, but
aggravates the offense to a Class X felony where the offense occurs near a school, and to a Class X
felony with a minimum imprisonment term of ten years where the firearm is discharged in the
direction of certain categories of person (such as peace officers, emergency medical technicians, and
teachers). 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/24-1.2-5 is similar to 5/24-1.2, but only applies to "machine guns" and
guns equipped with silencers. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/24-1.2-5(b) grades discharging such a firearm in
the direction of an ordinary person as a Class X felony, and aggravates the offense to a Class X felony
with a minimum term of 12 years where the firearm is discharged in the direction of certain persons, as
noted above. Finally, 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/24-3.2(b) treats recklessly discharging a firearm known to
be loaded with an "armor piercing bullet" as a Class X felony where the bullet strikes another.
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persons" -as a Class X felony.' Similarly, second-degree murder, which
requires knowingly causing another's death under a sudden and intense
passion (what most jurisdictions would call voluntary manslaughter), is a
Class I felony." Recklessly killing another person is a Class 3 felony.43
Thus, these "causing-harm" offenses end up with equal or lower grades
than the less serious "creating-risk-of-harm" offenses of discharging a
firearm in the direction of others.
This trend is both intrinsically harmful, in that it treats less serious
crimes more harshly than is appropriate, and subtly harmful, in that it
calls into question the moral authority and credibility of the criminal
code. It promotes disrespect for the law's commands rather than
increasing the law's deterrent effect. Such grading anomalies are not only
contrary to our intuitions regarding correct punishment, but also likely to
be counterproductive on their own utilitarian terms. And of course, there
is the absolute cost of the added levels of incarceration required by ever-
increasing statutory punishments.
In short, American criminal codes have, since their initial
codification, shown a tendency to become bigger and bigger. Bigger,
however, is not always better. Indeed, it is sometimes worse, for ad hoc
expansion reduces consistency and undermines the codes'
comprehensiveness in defining offenses.
B. WHAT DRIVES DEGRADATION
The underlying causes of degradation relate to the inherent nature
of the legislative process. Many amendments and new offenses are
enacted for purely political purposes: politicians propose a specific bill to
show concern about some apparently serious issue, or to respond to an
especially grim or headlined case (e.g., when an offender received little
or no punishment). Even in cases where the problem has little to do with
any existing legal rule-for example, a jury refused to convict, or a
sentencing judge ignored the seriousness of the offense in exercising
sentencing discretion-legislators often feel a need to show that they are
trying to do something. Often, the drafters and enactors of a new
provision do not know or especially care how it relates to the existing
code, so amendments might overlap in content with the code while
deviating from its form.
Criminal law proposals, however useless or even ridiculous they may
be, typically pass because legislators share a common reluctance to
appear "soft on crime." When a new and unnecessary specific offense,
such as "library theft," is proposed, the issue becomes a referendum on
41. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/20.5-5 (2004).
42. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-2 (2002).
43. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-3.
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whether legislators care about public libraries, not on whether the
proposed legislation will actually do anything to combat the problem of
theft or will instead have pernicious ramifications for the application of
the criminal code's general theft provision. As a result, the rational
legislator is likely to vote in favor of the library-theft bill because there is
a clear constituency-library users, and taxpayers generally-that will
benefit from its enactment, and no constituency to complain about the
new provision's more subtle and diffuse drawbacks.
II. SURMOUNTING THE OBSTACLES TO MODERN CRIMINAL CODE REFORM
Counteracting criminal code degradation will not occur by merely
pointing out the problems associated with the current trend and waiting
for the powers-that-be to reverse or eliminate them. Every major player
in the criminal reform game is likely to believe -mistakenly, as we
explain below-that major reform, even if it seems like a good idea
generally, runs counter to that individual player's own interests.
Accordingly, the identification of degradation as a problem and the
suggestion of broad-based criminal law reform is likely to meet
substantial resistance. For this reason, actual reform is extremely
unlikely without a concerted effort to overcome that resistance by
promoting discussion of reform and developing a compelling model code
or process to serve as a template for bringing about that reform.
A. WHY RELEVANT GROUPS OPPOSE REFORM (AND WHY THEY
SHOULDN'T)
Efforts toward criminal law reform regularly run up against
predictable hurdles. Every major constituency in the criminal justice
process has reasons to oppose recodification. As we shall discuss, each
group also has reasons to support such a project, but often those reasons
are less obvious to the group. The more obvious grounds for rejecting
reform therefore tend to drive participants' views.
I. Prosecutors and Other Law-Enforcement Authorities
One reason prosecutors oppose reform is because they tend to be
overwhelmed by the day-to-day burdens of dealing with their own
caseloads. The process of reform appears to be an overwhelming
distraction from the press of daily business. As prosecutors would be
forced to learn new provisions in addition to what they already know and
are comfortable with, reform appears to add only disruption. More
importantly, prosecutors are often concerned that the reform process
would reopen hard-fought (and usually victorious) legal and political
battles.
A somewhat more sinister explanation for prosecutorial resistance
to reform is the notion that the prosecutors actually benefit (or think
they do) from the fruits of degradation because a complex code with
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hundreds or thousands of overlapping provisions provides them with a
great deal of discretionary power and increased leverage to induce plea
bargains on their terms. The greater the number of offenses available,
the greater their discretion as to what and how many offenses are
charged. The greater the number and variety of offenses charged, the
greater the opportunity to intimidate defendants into plea bargains
favorable to the state.
Yet, prosecutors who deal with the criminal code every day should
also see the benefits of reform. A new code with fewer, but more general,
offenses can close existing loopholes in coverage and eliminate
complexities and ambiguities that introduce unpredictability, all of which
can be used by defense counsel to create litigable issues that would not
otherwise exist.' Additionally, clearer laws are easier to explain to juries,
and it is prosecutors, not defense counsel, who lose when legal
complexities and peculiarities produce jury confusion and hesitation.
The police are likely to share the fears of prosecutors: the potential
for chaos with a new, unfamiliar code; the high costs and numerous
inconveniences of transitioning to the new code; and the concern about
reopening settled legal battles. But the law enforcement community
should be excited about reform, especially given the shape reform would
likely take today. The current trend is to promote plain-language
drafting, which ensures that criminal provisions are clear and
comprehensible to non-lawyers.45 These ideas and concerns were not in
vogue in the 1950s and I96os when the Model Penal Code and its state-
code progeny were being developed. Today, however, people are less
willing to tolerate legalese and are more likely to demand a criminal code
44. For example, Illinois courts have allowed defendants to litigate on appeal the extent of force
necessary for the robbery offense. Compare, e.g., People v. Bowel, 488 N.E.2d 995, 998 (I11. 986)
(finding defendant took victim's purse by force when he pulled the purse from her arm while holding
her hand immobile and turning her body "slightly"), with People v. Patton, 389 N.E.2d 1174, 1177 (Ill.
1979) (reversing robbery conviction where defendant took victim's purse from her body "without any
sensible or material violence to the person," despite the fact that the victim's arm was thrown back "a
little bit").
Such problems can arise with respect to General Part provisions as well as specific offense
definitions. For example, because of a misreading of Illinois's provision seeking to explain, as the
Model Penal Code does using different language, that culpability terms define a hierarchy so that a
higher actual level of culpability satisfies a lower required one, the Illinois Supreme Court has
reversed convictions where the actual level differs in any way from the required one, as by finding that
"recklessness and knowledge are mutually inconsistent culpable mental states." People v. Fornear, 680
N.E.2d 1383, 1387 (I11. 997) (reversing, as legally inconsistent, convictions for multiple offenses where
one required knowledge and another required recklessness) (relying on People v. Spears, 493 N.E.2d
I030 (Ill. 1986)).
As noted earlier, overlapping offenses have also led to reversed convictions based on findings of
unconstitutionality under the Illinois Constitution's proportionate penalties clause. See supra note 35.
45. The Illinois Criminal Code Rewrite and Reform Commission included one member, an
English professor, who was specifically designated as the Commission's "plain-language consultant,"
charged with reviewing proposed provisions for readability.
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with provisions that the average layperson or police officer could easily
read, understand, and, most importantly, apply in actual situations.
2. Defense Attorneys
Defense attorneys may share prosecutors' worries about having to
learn an entirely new code and effectively starting at square one in
gaining familiarity with its statutory provisions. Like prosecutors, they
may see life as being too hectic to learn new provisions. Furthermore,
established defense attorneys, who often hold positions of leadership in
the defense community and are therefore the ones with the authority to
dominate or squelch reform efforts, have spent much of their careers
learning all "the angles" under the current code in order to acquire the
expertise that gives them a market advantage over their younger
competitors. While this may not be a conscious calculation on their part,
it may still shape their lack of enthusiasm for general code reform.
Even so, the defense bar may ultimately be less opposed to reform
than prosecutors, because it will tend to have less to lose, given that the
prosecutorial side of the debate would probably have won more past
political battles. In fact, defense attorneys should actively embrace
reform because they, like prosecutors, would get the benefit of clarity.
The lack of complex and overlapping offenses would decrease the
potential for prosecutorial manipulation.
One of the special virtues of a broad recodification effort is the
opportunity it provides to review the grading system as a whole and
consider how all the offenses relate to one another, rather than
considering individual offenses in a vacuum. This kind of review enables
the parties to focus not only on specific offenses, but also on how to
establish a rational, proportionate grading scheme among all offenses.
The opportunity to engage in such a broad review of relative offense
grading is also likely to benefit the defense (and the taxpayers who
ultimately foot the bill for extended prison terms) by reducing the
number of new offenses with high penalties that reflect the political heat
of the moment.
3. Judges
Judges, especially appellate judges, have invested both time and
careers developing the case law that interprets existing code provisions;
these efforts are sometimes seen as being wiped out by the enactment of
new statutes. As a result, judges are naturally reluctant to have the
legislature exercise its superior law-making authority-for the less the
legislature acts, the more power judges have. Any legislative action to
close statutory loopholes or to resolve statutory ambiguities only
emphasizes the judiciary's relative lack of power.
Yet judges too should see important benefits of reform. A cleaner,
less ambiguous code should be easier to administer. Its clear terms
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should facilitate plea-bargaining, help parties understand the legal rules,
and reduce judges' dockets. Trial courts will be able to interpret or apply
statutes more quickly and with a lower risk of reversal. This is especially
true with respect to jury instructions, whose clarity or opacity will tend to
track that of the underlying code provisions. When codes are
unnecessarily complex-or poorly or hastily written, as is often true of
the new special offenses that fail to employ the code's general
vocabulary-jury instructions are more likely to contain weaknesses that
risk reversal on appeal. 6
Put simply, code reform is not jettisoning decades of judicial
thought, but rather building on it. Smart code drafters look closely at the
case law to identify the present code's ambiguities and often borrow
solutions based on judicial experience and wisdom.
4. Legislators
Legislators also tend to oppose general recodification efforts
because no one wants to lose her own pet provisions in the current law.
Yet legislators should see a broad reform project as an enormous
opportunity, for it gives the legislature the potential to firmly reassert its
institutional powers and prerogatives. Statutory interpretations
developed through judicial decisions do not necessarily track the original
legislative design.47 Moreover, many legislators, if they understand how
46. For example, an amendment to the Illinois reckless-homicide offense sought to establish that
recklessness "shall be presumed" for persons driving under the influence of alcohol and drugs. See 720
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-3(b), 9-3(c) (2002). At least one court has held that this language creates an
unconstitutional mandatory presumption. See People v. Pomykala, 759 N.E.2d 916, 99 (I11. App. Ct.
2ooi) ("Here, we find the statute and jury instructions clearly established a mandatory
presumption.... Such a burden shift to the defendant is always unconstitutional.").
Cf. ILL. PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CRIMINAL) 13.38A (4th ed. 2000) (refusing to instruct jury as
to rule in 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5 /17 -(B)(d) (2003) enabling use of certain "prima facie evidence,"
because "[tjhe term is a legal one which ... might be read by a jury as creating a type of presumption
that is constitutionally impermissible in criminal cases" (citing People v. Gray, 426 N.E.2d 290, 293 (Ill.
App. Ct. i981))).
47. We offer here just two examples of the courts' failure to recognize legislative intent, but there
are various others. First, the I96i Illinois Code intended to abolish any requirement of "malice" for
the offense of murder. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-I, Committee Comments- i96I, at 16 (West
2002) ("Section 9-1 is intended.., to avoid the use of the difficult 'malice' language.... The words
relating to the mental states of intent and knowledge are used in the sense in which they are defined in
Article 4."); People v. Jeffries, 646 N.E.2d 587, 594 (Ill. 1995) ("Because the term 'malice
aforethought' was not susceptible to clear definition, the legislature eliminated any reference to it in
the definition of murder in the new criminal code." (citations omitted)).
Nevertheless, Illinois courts occasionally suggest that malice remains an element of murder. See,
e.g., People v. Stokes, 689 N.E.2d 625, 630 (I11. App. Ct. i997) ("To sustain a charge of attempt to
murder, it is sufficient to discharge a weapon in the direction of another individual, either with malice
or total disregard for human life."); People v. Medrano, 648 N.E.2d 218, 223 (IlI. App. Ct. 1995)
("Murder is the unlawful killing of another person with malice aforethought."); People v. Jerome, 564
N.E.2d 221, 225 (Il1. App. Ct. i99o) ("In drafting the murder.., statute, the legislature intended to
retain the common-law concepts of express and implied malice but to replace those terms with the
more modern and less ambiguous terms of intent and knowledge respectively."). As one Illinois court
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the system works and are honest with themselves, recognize the need for
recodification. They know how political pressures work to create
perverse incentives. What they might also consider is how the discussion
and development of a new code creates new political opportunities. To
put the issue in a more cynical political light, legislators ought to see a
new code not as simply a loss of old "deals," but as an opportunity to
employ their skills and authority in resolving conflicting interests through
the striking of new deals.
Making things worse, each of these groups-prosecutors, defense
attorneys, judges, and legislators-is highly suspicious of the others. If
one group overcomes its initial self-interested reluctance and decides to
support general recodification, the other groups often take this as a sign
that recodification would help that group at the expense of the others. As
a result, the groups that have not decided to support recodification are
instinctively inclined to oppose it.
B. How ENTRENCHED OPPOSITION FRUSTRATES REFORM EFFORTS
When it comes to the existence of entrenched opposition to criminal
code reform, we know of what we speak. We have witnessed firsthand, in
both Illinois and Kentucky, the tendency of various participants in the
criminal justice and political systems to object to the idea of reform itself,
even before any specific reforms have been discussed or proposed.
In Illinois, the code reform project had barely gotten off the ground
when prosecutors expressed their opposition and were unwilling to
devote manpower or resources to assist in the project, even though their
participation would have assured them a voice within the decision-
making group. Judges were also hostile to the prospect of developing a
new code. They were both unwilling to part with their own case law and
has observed, this reading "diminishes both the clear language of these.. . statutes and the legislative
intent in enacting them." People v. Newbern, 579 N.E.2d 583, 595 (Il1. App. Ct. I991).
Second, the 1961 Illinois Code, like the Model Penal Code, establishes a "substantial step" test as
the conduct requirement for an attempt. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-4(a) (2002). However, although the
substantial step test's proper focus is on how far an actor has gone from the beginning of the causal
chain leading to the offense, Illinois courts have sometimes read the provision as retaining the prior
"dangerous proximity" test, which focuses on how close to the end of the causal chain he has come. See
People v. Smith, 593 N.E.2d 533, 537 (11. 1992); People v. Terrell, 459 N.E.2d 1337, 1341 (Ill. 1984)
(quoting Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 388 (1912) (Holmes, J., dissenting)). For example, in
Smith, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed a conviction for attempted robbery, finding that the
defendant's acts were not a "substantial step" because it would be "improper to conclude that
defendant came within a dangerous proximity to success." 593 N.E.2d at 537. The Court so held as a
matter of law, although whether a defendant has taken a "substantial step" toward committing an
offense should normally be a question for the jury. Id. Rather than asking whether there was sufficient
evidence for the jury to find that the defendant had taken a substantial step toward the offense, the
Court engaged in an independent inquiry as to how far away the defendant was from completing the
offense. Id. That analysis misreads the statute-and also improperly takes the substantial step
determination away from the jury.
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uninterested in the prospect of having to make an effort to read and
learn new statutes. Because so many people were antagonistic to the
entire project, it was nearly impossible to engage in a serious discussion
about specific reforms. Furthermore, few were interested in contributing
the time or effort needed to participate in a drafting work group, in part
because they had already made a political determination that there was
enough resistance to block criminal code reform.4
In Kentucky, the process worked slightly better, primarily because a
suitable preexisting reform infrastructure already existed: the
constitutionally-created Criminal Justice Cabinet had created a Criminal
Justice Council to perform criminal justice oversight and reform. A small
group was established to spearhead the code reform project and to
engage in discussions. But even there, the prosecutors withdrew from the
drafting effort to signal their opposition to any kind of broad code
reform. Ultimately, the project did not get mired down in procedural
issues or broad questions about the proper extent of reform and was able
to move on to substantive proposals and debate because there was
significant interest by other parties, an existing vehicle for the project
work, and willing participants interested in the initial drafting and
decision-making process. Nevertheless, the likelihood of success remains
unclear because of the ongoing opposition of prosecutors and the
uncertainties of the legislative process.49
C. How TO OVERCOME THE OPPOSITION TO REFORM
We don't claim to have all the answers about how to accomplish
reform (neither the new Illinois Code nor the new Kentucky Code is on
the books yet) But our experiences have given us some ideas on how to
at least mitigate, if not fully eliminate, interested parties' natural
disinclination to support broad criminal code reform.
One possibility relates to the structure and process of state-level
reform efforts. There are two crucial steps that must be taken
immediately at the beginning a state code reform project. First,
participants must be given, by someone whose opinion they trust, the
sales pitch we set forth above in section II.A., to explain and persuade
48. In fact, the proposed Illinois Criminal Code hammered out among those groups who were
willing to participate-see FINAL REPORT OF THE ILLINOIS CRIMINAL CODE REWRITE AND REFORM
COMMISSION (STATE OF ILLINOIS 2003) (two volumes), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/
fac/phrobinsillinois/-might have succeeded despite the resistance, but for the ensuing political and
legal troubles of the then-sitting Governor, George Ryan, who declined to seek re-election. The new
administration, in addition to having its own legislative priorities, saw broad criminal code reform as
an agenda item of the preceding administration, and therefore something from which to distance itself.
49. As in Illinois, the Governor's seat has changed hands, and the newcomer saw little appeal to a
project started by his predecessor. One of the many political realities that hurts criminal code reform is
the fact that, because it commonly takes quite long, it is easy for the political landscape to change
before the process is complete.
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them that their visceral opposition to reform ignores or downplays the
benefits such a project may provide for them as a group, not just
"criminal law" in the abstract. Second, the reform project must be
organized so that each interest group feels it has a voice. Each group
should be encouraged to contribute to the development and revision of
the proposed new code, so that they will feel they have a personal stake
and interest in the code when it is complete.
in short, participants must be convinced that a reform project
represents an enormous opportunity for them, not a threat. In our
experience, most of the actual participants in the reform process initially
view their participation, at best, as a chore-merely an added burden on
top of the many pressures and stresses imposed by their "real" jobs. The
crucial task at the outset of such a project is to make clear to these
people that the project has huge potential to improve both the law and
their own jobs.
Another possibility, operating outside the political process of
individual states, is to pursue a major independent model criminal code
reform exercise (such as a second-generation Model Penal Code) that
could spur reform in the states." As it did in the I96os and 197Os, a
Model Code from the well-respected American Law Institute (ALl)
could help prompt the reform that individual states find difficult to
undertake on their own. Few states have the resources or the expertise to
do the kind of broad and thoughtful recodification work from scratch
that the ALI can do. Furthermore, the promulgation of a Model Penal
Code (Second) would provide a useful public acknowledgment that our
forty years of experience with the Model Code has revealed its flaws and
that, even with regard to its well-drafted provisions, times and
perspectives change.'
Those states whose codes are based on the Model Penal Code-
essentially all modem American criminal codes-cannot easily ignore
the fact that their foundational model has itself been redone by its
drafters. Indeed, it is likely that thoughtful Model Penal Code (Second)
drafters would study and learn much from the common variations on the
Model Code's formulations created by the states that used the Code as
their model. This reliance would give a Model Penal Code (Second) even
more credibility and influence with the states in promoting subsequent
state recodification.
50. See Paul H. Robinson & Michael T. Cahill, Model Penal Code Second: Good or Bad Idea?
Can a Model Penal Code Second Save the States from Themselves?, i OHIO ST. J. CR1m. L. 169 (2003).
51. We have both written before about the revealed shortcomings of the Model Penal Code. See
Michael T. Cahill, Offense Grading and Multiple Liability: New Challenges for a Model Penal Code
Second, i OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 599 (2004); Paul H. Robinson, Reforming the Federal Criminal Code: A
Top Ten List, I BUFF. Clam. L. REV. 225 (1997).
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III. STRUCTURING FUTURE CRIMINAL CODE REFORM
Let us assume that individual states pick up the cause of reform, or
that the ALI answers our clarion call and develops a Model Penal Code
(Second) that states implement. What happens the day after any given
state's wonderful new criminal code is enacted and takes effect? The
same degradation-promoting forces we have identified above would still
exist. How do we avoid, ten or twenty years after enactment of the new
code, being in the same unfortunate position we are in today?
The single most significant reform to counteract the forces of
degradation might be to reform the criminal code amendment process.
Experience has shown that we cannot count on legislators to avoid the
present degradation process. They have a valid interest in showing their
care about criminal justice issues that their constituents want them to
address. The question is whether we can channel that pro-change energy
into something more productive.
In this Part, we offer some suggestions based on our observations in
Parts I and II regarding the underlying causes of criminal code
degradation.
A. INTERNAL CHANGE: REFORMING THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS FROM
WITHIN
First, legislators need to recognize that a criminal code presents
unique legislative problems and they need to develop specific
institutional expertise regarding criminal law. The typical piece of state
legislation has as its audience lawyers or specialists in the affected
institutions; criminal law legislation is unusual in that its audience is the
average citizen. Effective communication to that audience presents
special issues not shared by other areas of the law, as reflected by the fact
that the legality principle and its many articulating doctrines have
application only to criminal law.52 Procedures must be developed to
ensure that when a legislator adds a new provision, the provision is
written in language consistent with, and with an understanding of, the
existing criminal code. This may require developing within the legislative
drafting process some long-term institutional expertise regarding the
underlying principles and structure of the criminal code.
It also may help to add certain provisions to the criminal code. For
example, one or more provisions might explicitly signal the code's
operational structure in order to provide an educational outline of the
code's organization for reference by future reformers. 3 Other provisions
52. For a discussion of the doctrines and rationales of the legality principle and its unique
application to criminal law, see PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW § 2.2 (1997).
53. See, e.g., KY. PENAL CODE § 501.201 (Proposed Official Draft 2003) (explicitly describing the
relation between Code's offenses, defenses, and imputation rules); ILL. CRIM. CODE § 201 (Proposed
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might collect and advertise the code's defined terms, in order to promote
their use in subsequent amendments. 4
B. SYSTEMIC CHANGE: CREATING A STANDING CRIMINAL LAW COMMISSION
A more radical proposal is to create a standing commission to
oversee and review criminal law reform. The commission does not need
to involve a full-time obligation, particularly if it is able to retain a small
permanent staff of just one or two attorneys. Part-time positions increase
the possibility that the commission can attract the most competent
people in the state.
A standing commission would provide several advantages. It would
ensure that criminal law decisions are made, or at least approved or
vetted, by people with expertise whose long-term experience with the
code would ensure consistency. The commission could issue "impact
statements" that analyze the likely effect of proposed amendments to the
code, and could provide specific draft language in proper code form for a
requested amendment. An unelected commission of criminal law experts
would be superior to the legislature not only in its knowledge and
expertise, but also in its freedom from political pressure. If a new
proposed offense is completely unnecessary and potentially
counterproductive, the commission could say so publicly and provide
political cover for legislators who wish to vote it down without drawing
the politically lethal criticism of being "soft on crime." Indeed, the
prospect of an honest and independent commission of experts publicly
pronouncing bad legislation to be foolish might deter such legislation
from being proposed in the first place. Legislators would have an
incentive to run their proposals by the commission beforehand, and bad
proposals could be eliminated quietly before seeing the light of day.
Such a scheme would require politicians to give up some of their
current opportunities for political grandstanding but it is not
unreasonable to think that they might do this voluntarily. Consider, for
example, that the U.S. Congress abrogated a great deal of its own
authority over sentencing issues by creating the U.S. Sentencing
Commission. Of course, Congress also continues to enact statutory
mandatory minimum sentences that undercut the authority of the
Sentencing Guidelines.5 Even so, the Commission's efforts have
Official Draft 2003) (same).
54. See, e.g., Ky. PENAL CODE § 500.107 (Proposed Official Draft 2003) (collecting all defined
terms used in Code); ILL. CRIM. CODE § Io8 (Proposed Official Draft 2003) (same). The proposed
Codes also collect, at the end of each specific Code article, all defined terms used in that article,
whether the definition itself appears within the article or elsewhere in the Code. See, e.g., KY. PENAL
CODE § 512.1206 (Proposed Official Draft 2003) (collecting all defined terms used in assault article);
ILL. CRIM. CODE § 1206 (Proposed Official Draft 2003) (same).
55. The recent battles over the Feeney Amendment suggest that some politicians would like to
take back some of the power that was delegated to the Commission by the Sentencing Reform Act of
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profoundly changed the preexisting system in an area where Congress
had ultimate authority but was willing to restrain its own power to
advance the interests of justice. 6
C. POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY CHANGE: GIVING COMMENTARY THE FORCE OF
LAW
A final possibility is for the legislature to simultaneously adopt an
official commentary to a new criminal code, perhaps similar in form to
the commentary for the Model Penal Code, and give that commentary
legal force. This would not only provide the traditional benefits of
adopting a code commentary, which are enhanced if the commentary is
kept up to date, but it would also create an opportunity for political
action short of changing the code. If the legislature wanted to make clear
that specific conduct fell within the terms of an existing offense, it could
add an illustration to the commentary to this effect instead of creating an
entirely new offense with elements that would almost entirely replicate
the already-existing offense. For example, .theft of a delivery-container,57
or endangerment by feeding a child athlete a drug designed for quick
weight gain or loss,"5 could simply be given as commentary examples of
existing offenses, rather than being enacted as new and unnecessary
distinct offenses.
Furthermore, individual legislators could show concern for, and
could be seen as doing something to address, the criminal problem of the
day by passing legislation that amends the official commentary rather
than making an unnecessary code change that could harm rather than
help the code's operation. This would make it easier to maintain the
original code's clarity, consistency, and austerity over time, with fewer
new offenses being added, less overlap, and less introduction of
confusion and contradiction.
In our work to revise the Kentucky criminal code, a similar proposal
met with a good deal of support, somewhat to our surprise. That interest
may well be an indication that even legislators understand the
1984. The original proposal, for example, would have taken away authority to give a downward
sentencing departure for reasons other than those enumerated, and would have dramatically scaled
back the list of enumerated reasons. See Stephanos Bibas, The Feeney Amendment and the Continuing
Rise of Prosecutorial Power to Plea Bargain, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 295, 296 & n.2 (2004).
56. Readers should not take this reference to the United States Sentencing Commission as a
statement of approval of the Commission's work. One of us is on record as the sole dissenter to the
promulgation of the Commission's guidelines. See Dissenting View of Commissioner Paul H. Robinson
to the Promulgation of Sentencing Guidelines by the United States Sentencing Commission, 52 FED.
REG. 18,121 (987), reprinted in 41 CRIM. L. REP. 3174-85 (1987). We mean to cite approvingly only the
example of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, which, despite its misguided implementation by the
Commission, was an inspired piece of legislation that had, and still has, the potential to bring
uniformity and fairness to federal criminal sentencing.
57. See supra note 16.
58. See supra note 39.
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detrimental dynamics of the current crime legislation process and are
seeking an alternative. Nor would adoption of an official commentary be
such a radical idea: many state codes, including that of Illinois, have
supporting commentary, or did when they were first enacted." The
proposal here is simply to have that commentary maintained and
updated as documents of continuing usefulness rather than left to
become out of date and increasingly irrelevant.
Ideally, a state might adopt several of the reforms we suggest above.
But our larger point is that because the greatest source of problems in
modem American criminal codes is degradation rather than the
existence of basic flaws in their structure or an absence of needed
coverage, the most valuable contribution a second wave of criminal code
reform might make is to develop and propose a variety of structural
reforms to avoid criminal code degradation in the future.
CONCLUSION
Evidence of the continuing and evidently accelerating degradation
of criminal codes, and the serious problems it creates is overwhelming.
Reversal of this trend and the prevention of future degradation will
require major reforms, but no single magic moment of reform will do the
trick. Although a fundamental code revision-the hallmark of the last
major wave of criminal law reform-can slow future code degradation, a
new code cannot fully protect itself against this problem. Only significant
(but feasible) structural changes and ongoing vigilance will provide any
chance of keeping American criminal codes from collapsing under their
own weight.
59. See generally 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. (including original Commentary for 1961 Criminal
Code) (West 2000).
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